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Abstract 
In 2000, the Higher Education Funding Council of England required all universities to 
implement risk management as a governance tool since it expected an increase in efficiency in 
decision making. While the regulatory regime has been described in literature, the response of 
universities remained greatly unknown. This paper outlines a first attempt to investigate the 
identification strategies of academic risks. Based on a limited set of risk registers developed 
by universities covering the entire range of English universities, this discussion paper presents 
three major findings. Firstly, universities could not capture the core functions of universities, 
teaching and research, with organisational means. Secondly, universities had to find proxies 
that they could link up with organisational decisions. In this context, the emerging concept of 
reputational risk provides an all-purpose tool for risk management allowing universities to 
capture all possible challenges and problems in terms of risk. Thirdly, when universities 
identify academic risks, structural features such size, international and research orientation or 
the degree of collegiality in decision making shape the way academic risks are defined. These 
initial findings could direct further research that seems essential for better understanding of 
academic risk management and its effect on universities.  
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Introduction 
 
In 2000, the Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE) required all universities 
to introduce risk management as governance tool. Risk is not the object of regulatory policy 
making but a method to facilitate and improve decision making. This alteration in the 
functionality of risk is characteristic of recent developments in the English regulatory state 
(Hood et al. 2001: 4; Moran 2003; Rothstein et al. 2006). Risk management prioritises 
activities and events according to their impact and probability, which, in turn, should improve 
the efficiency and accountability of decision-making. This promise is given for all risk-based 
governance ‘as part of the “modernizing government” agenda, as a way of maximising the 
benefits of regulation while minimising the burden of regulates by offering “targeted” and 
“proportionate” interventions (…) Risk based regulation has been promoted as an 
economically rational decision making instrument for managing the difficult trade-offs 
between competing priorities that are inherent in any regulatory activity’ (Rothstein et al. 
2006: 97). HEFCE endorsed this line of argument claiming: ‘when used well, it [risk 
management, M.H.] can actively allow an institution to take on activities that have a higher 
level of risk (and therefore could deliver a greater benefit) because the risks have been 
identified, are understood and are being well managed and the residual risk is thereby lower’ 
(HEFCE 2001a: 1). Moreover, risk management should strengthen the organisation of the 
university, make it more rational and support strategic decision making (cf Brunsson & 
Sahlin-Andersson 2000). Improving decision making capacities however is only one benefit 
to governance ascribed to risk management. Benefits can also be derived from the risk 
protocols, documenting compliance and shielding bureaucracies when they are blamed for 
negative effects of risky decisions (Hood & Rothstein 2001).2  
 
HEFCE’s risk initiative and the regulatory risk framework in higher education have been 
examined recently (e.g. C. Huber 2009; M. Huber 2010; Power et al. 2009). We know about 
the general expectations of risk management in higher education, about the aspiration of 
rational behaviour and about the growing legitimacy, accountability and efficiency that risk 
should generate for higher education. We know the regulatory framework. However, we 
know little about how universities as primary addressees of regulation adapt to the new risk 
tool and how they use it. How do universities identify risks? Can universities enjoy the 
promised benefits of better governance and accountability? Are all universities benefitting 
from risk management uniformly or can we observe how some organisations benefit more 
than others? Only one of these question is the focus of this paper, namely, how universities 
identify academic risks. While regulators develop a comprehensive and uniform risk 
management template, university risk management is expected to reflect the specific 
environment and the local organisational skills. Accordingly, variations in risk management 
will occur reflecting organisational features such as size, visibility or profile, e.g. in research 
or teaching. Universities, however, generate an additional challenge to the idea of improving 
decision making, as they are considered incapable of rational decision making. For example, 
Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson (2000: 734) conceptualise the university as an arena ‘because 
its members and what they do, are legitimately guided by external interests, values norm and 
standards rather than by an internally generated organizational policy’. Others depict 
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universities as an empty organisational shell that is unable to act strategically (Braun 2001). It 
is a common trait of university studies to highlight such organisational shortcomings.3 Thus, 
risk management and with it, the expectation about rationalisation, meets an organisation that 
is characterised by ‘organised anarchy’ (Cohen & March 1974) or even resistance to reform 
(cf Stichweh 1994). In the context of academic risk management this raises questions about 
how risk is shaping university reform. Is academic risk management one step towards turning 
universities into rational, strategic actors or is it just another ‘ritual of verification’ (Power 
1997)? Is risk adapted to these particular organisational circumstances? 
 
Reconstructing the unfolding of risk management at university level provides insight into a 
process of modernisation of higher education and draws attention to the specific conditions of 
implementing risk as an organising concept. This paper is structured in seven sub-sections in 
the following order: a brief conceptual outline on the spreading of risk management and the 
effects on the ‘university’ as special organisation; a sketch of the regulatory framework 
developed by HEFCE; some methodological remarks; delineation of a preliminary 
comparative analysis of how risk registers are structured and some preliminary finding on 
how these structural pre-conditions unfold as a function of organisational structures; analysis 
of the content of risk registers outlining which risk events are selected and how they are 
assessed; and finally, a focus on the emergence and function of reputational risks as a genuine 
form of academic risks.  
 
 
Risk management in academia 
 
With the growth of the university sector in the 1980s tightly linked to the New Public 
Management, the demand for the efficient use of taxpayer’s money emerged and increasingly 
required universities to be accountable to stakeholders. In 1984, McNamara & Booth (1984: 
175) predicted that universities will ‘come under the same pressure as the rest of the public 
sector to demonstrate that they provide value for money’. To meet these expectations the 
authors suggested risk to be a feasible management approach. Irrespective of this early 
warning, the introduction of risk management into British academia in 2000 was still 
observed with some perplexity and universities responded to the HEFCE initiative with 
hesitation and critique. For instance, the University of Cambridge criticised these new 
management strategies as ‘alien to the character of the University and do carry pressures 
which could seriously damage the flexibility and diversity which is a particular strength of 
Cambridge; they would certainly be unprofitable for a University such as this’ (Raban and 
Turner 2003: 22). Such a response suggests that risk management was imposed on 
universities. Even if this is the case for some institutions, not all universities felt alienated by 
risk. Others embraced risk management – in accordance with official statement – that there 
would be substantive benefits for complying with the new rules (cf Raban & Turner 2006). 
For them, risk management provides a suite of forensic ideas, concepts and tools for 
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concept of loose coupling. However, the authors do not share the view that loosely coupled or anarchic 
organisations are deficient. ‘People who are steeped in the conventional literature of organizations may regard 
loose coupling as a sin or something to be apologized for. This paper takes a neutral, if not mildly affectionate, 
stance toward the concept’ (Weick 1976: 6; emphasis added).  
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systematically gathering and analysing information about potentially adverse events and 
developing strategies in response to these challenges in the higher education sector.  
 
Neo-institutionalism suggests that the process of diffusing ideas like risk management across 
academia would converge in a prototypical ‘risk university’ (for the convergence hypothesis 
see Frank & Meyer 2007). The convergence would be explained by the concept of 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1991) distinguishing between actors being mandated to 
apply a certain management tool (coercive isomorphism) and mimetic isomorphism where 
organisations imitate features of successful management tools. Both forms of isomorphism 
can be found in the case of English higher education: coercive, as universities were obliged to 
use risk management and mimetic, as HEFCE intentionally opted for a university-based 
approach to risk management. ‘HEFCE accepts that each individual institution will have its 
own system of corporate governance tailored to its own particular objectives and management 
processes’ (HEFCE 2000: 1). However, no university provided a role model. Despite the huge 
pressure to implement risk management in academia, empirical facts and theoretical 
considerations confronted this convergence hypothesis. Firstly, English universities are 
required but reluctant to implement risk management tools as they claim in interviews that the 
HEFCE template for a unifying function is in fact useless. Secondly, this top down model of 
convergence provides a higher education reform that is not only too narrow but too optimistic 
of its success. The optimism depends on the expectation that ideas can be copied into all 
environments. However, it has been shown that organisational templates are not copied, but 
adapted and ‘edited’ (Wedlin 2007).4 These arguments suggest that instead of convergence in 
a uniform risk university, the introduction of risk management will instead yield a range of 
risk universities.  
 
Moreover, adaptation and imitation are concepts that demand certain features of 
organisations. For example, North (1990: 4 f) distinguishes institutions and organisations by 
reference to rules of the game and a team of players, claiming ‘the objective of the team 
within a set of rules is to win the game – by a combination of skills, strategy and 
coordination’. Thus, in order to succeed, organisations need to use opportunities and interpret 
the rules of the game at times in ‘isomorphic’ ways, by innovating or transgressing the 
traditional framework. It is due to their interpretative effort that ‘organisations are … a major 
agent of institutional change’ (North 1990: 5). Organisations are conceptualised as rational, 
autonomous and strategically skilled actors, capable of exploiting opportunities. In contrast to 
these expectations, the university is depicted as an organisational type, incapable of rational 
decision making and lacking strategy. For example, these organisational particularities of 
universities are described as a loosely coupled system, ‘richly connected networks in which 
influence is slow to spread and /or is weak while spreading, … a relative lack of coordination 
… infrequent inspection of activities within the system … those occasions when no matter 
what you do things always come out the same’ (Weick 1976: 5). Loose coupling generates a 
multifaceted, sensitive organisation that nevertheless fails to take, and in turn, to implement 
decisions across all departments. The innovative potential of the loosely coupled organisation 
balances local inventions and lack of internal coordination, undermining rational strategic 
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hinders a simple imitation process. 
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decisions. Meyer & Rowan (1977: 354) highlight another shortcoming when they characterise 
universities by ‘variable, unclear technologies to reproduce outputs that are difficult to 
appraise’. Unclear technology is a concept that Cohen et al. (1972: 1) describe as follows: 
‘Although the organization manages to survive and even produce, its own processes are not 
understood by its members. It operates on the basis of simple trial-and-error procedures, the 
residue of learning from the accidents of past experience, and pragmatic inventions of 
necessity.’ In the context of higher education, teaching and research are identified as unclear 
technologies as these central academic functions ‘are difficult to describe … they can hardly 
be prescribed … and they are difficult to reproduce’ (Musselin 2007: 72). Both, unclear 
technology and loose coupling describe an incomplete organisation (Brunsson & Sahlin-
Andersson 2000). These ‘deficiencies’ contradict the expectation that templates of risk 
management can be imitated. Attempts to implement governance tools at universities are 
bound to fail as ‘formal structures and procedures … hardly define what to do and how to do 
it because of the specific characteristics of teaching and research described above … As a 
result, changing the formal structure most of the time has no effect’ (Musselin 2007: 75, 
emphasis added). Even if risk management does not fail, it will be shaped by these structural 
features of the organisation and may gain a paradoxical status in this setting: the use of risk 
management signals to stakeholders and regulatory agencies that universities are already 
rational actors and, simultaneously it may be considered a means to overcome the structural 
impediments to rationality. This draws not only justified attention to the organisational skills 
of universities, e.g. to control and reform the core functions, but also to strategies on how the 
risk tool is adapted to the organisational needs and interests in the transformation process.   
 
Some preliminary answers to the question of how universities appropriate risk management 
can be given by an analysis of local risk registers. These registers reflect not only how 
universities identify academic risks, but indirectly also point to organisational responsibilities 
and power structures that shape the implementation side of risk management, including the 
adaptation of the tool itself.  
 
 
Methodological remarks 
 
One of the key issues in the regulatory context concerns the difficulty in clarifying academic 
risks. Exploring the field, Dr Tola Amodu (LSE) and I collected publications, documents on 
risk management issued by regulatory agencies and universities, and interviewed risk 
managers (LSE, Bristol, Derby, HEFCE) and communicated with scholars about the issue e.g. 
Gareth Williams (London), Colin Raban (Derby), Carolyne Booker (Strathclyde). The 
information derived from these interviews and communication drew our attention to risk 
registers where universities define their individual risk portfolios. When investigating how 
risk registers mirror the university’s attempt to adapt to risk management, the main concern 
was less to provide an overview over registers, but rather to analyse a few risk registers in 
detail.5 This analysis was expected to reveal how universities identify academic risks and by 
                                                        
5
  We tried to still cover a wide range of universities including large and small institutions, elite and other 
universities. Some of these registers have been published and can be found on the university’s website. For 
example: http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/offices/secretariat/risk/register/, http://www.derby.ac.uk/risk-
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that mirror the structural constraints to risk management in higher education. A detailed 
analysis of the few risk registers aimed to develop a structural hypothesis on how universities 
change through their use of the risk tool. Those preliminary hypotheses should then be 
investigated further. 
 
The study is also restricted in some other ways. Firstly, risk registers are adapted and 
developed at least on a yearly basis. How registers develop over time has not been taken up 
here. The empirical analysis is restricted to 2009. Secondly, in most cases, risk registers are 
not one integral record but rather a series of documents that span from registers produced by 
the various level of administration to documents related to individual (research) projects. 
They are written at different points in time and with varying expertise. A comprehensive 
picture of risk management is available – if at all – only to specialised risk officers of the 
individual university. The reconstruction of complete registers cannot therefore be carried out 
in this explorative study (but would be an undertaking worth pursuing). Thus, we restricted 
our data collection to registers issued by central administrations.6 Thirdly, risk registers 
provide guidelines (e.g. how to differentiate risk levels) and ensure internal coherence. Thus, 
there are substantive restrictions to what we can learn from this analysis. For example, the 
registers do not directly indicate who carries out the risk assessments. When the risk registers 
ascribe ownership to individuals, office holders or committees that monitor the university’s 
environment for risks and as such constitute the central elements of an early warning system, 
this attribution often does not coincide with decisional powers or formal responsibilities. 
Fourthly, we chose to focus on written statements as we were interested in analysing 
organisational decisions and were less interested in the observations of university members. 
Written communication constitutes the core of organisational decision making as it allows 
organisations to follow up on such documents, irrespective of individual memory. Written 
documents are the backbone of organisational routines (cf Weber 1978).   
 
 
The emergence of academic risks
7
  
 
To outline the institutional framework for university risk management, we distinguish three 
phases of HEFCE’s search for academic risks (for more details see C. Huber 2009; M. Huber 
2010).  
 
• After reviewing its accounting instructions, HEFCE decided to initiate a risk management 
approach, as ‘there are genuine business benefits to be gained … quite apart from 
improvements in accountability and shareholder confidence’ (HEFCE 2000: 1). Risk was 
defined as ‘the threat or possibility that an action or event will adversely or beneficially 
affect and organisation’s ability to achieve its objectives’ (HEFCE 2001: 1). Although 
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 Few registers are published. The disclosed documents we could access and which are part of this analysis, 
showed no notable difference from publicised registers.  
7
 The overview provided here focuses on the English regime and English universities. The focus has been 
chosen because of presentational simplicity. If the analysis would be expanded to the UK, the variations of the 
Welsh, Northern Irish and Scottish regulatory framework would have to be accounted for even though this 
would not add substantively to our findings, but just complicate the presentation enormously. 
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explicitly all risks should be managed, risk management was tightly linked to financial 
issues. However, at this point in time it was not evident, what the academic risks actually 
were and what the consequences of risk taking could be.  
• With a first guide to Good Practice in Risk Management (HEFCE 2001b), HEFCE 
began a search for academic risks not only at a corporate, but also at faculty or 
departmental level. Academic risk could comprise everything from adverse publicity, 
financial losses, students, overseas operations, poor results in Research Assessments 
Exercise (RAE)8 and risks to life and limb during academic excursions. HEFCE 
published risk registers that took different forms. We first found lists of all known and 
assumedly relevant factors, problems, events and challenges influencing university 
performance A slightly more structured approach was launched after 2002 with a risk 
tree where eight main areas of risk were identified and a set of sub-risks attributed to 
each area (Huber 2010: 128 ff). With a prompt list of academic risks, HEFCE not only 
discriminated risks levels, but also identified ‘contributing factors’, ‘mitigating actions’ 
and ‘early warning mechanisms’ as relevant features of risk management. These features 
allowed academic risk to be embedded into university governance.  
• From around 2005 until today, policy documents no longer focus on singular risks, but 
risk areas. Academic risk management gained structure and started to identify causes 
covering wide temporal and spatial arrays. Risk management pointed towards a complex 
intertwined system of organisational, regulatory and societal structures that determine 
the risks to be taken.  
 
At this point, universities took up risk management as a governance tool and started to 
develop their own registers. 
 
 
Structuring risk registers 
 
HEFCE’s risk regime was laid out in the form soft rules and best practice guidelines. These 
soft rules required selection and interpretation of which events could be relevant risks and to 
identify their specific risk portfolio, individual universities should follow what HEFCE calls 
individual ‘risk appetite’ (e.g. HEFCE 2001b). The results of the interpretative process are 
publicised in form of risk registers. They either inform university members about risk 
management or they spread the information beyond the university to an interested public; the 
main addressees however are the regulatory agencies, HEFCE and the Quality Assessment 
Agency. Risk registers reveal how universities search for academic risks and how risks 
management varies in accordance to organisational features. Analysing this process, we first 
focus on the ‘form’, then on the ‘content’ of these registers.  
 
Accounting for risks 
Generally, the relevance of risk events in risk registers is revealed in two ways: either the 
risks are listed (or ranked) or they are grouped according to criteria such as administrative 
tasks, visibility or institutional manageability.  
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Hierarchical risk lists rank risk events. The main difference between them is the ranking 
criteria and the number of events this registers account for. For example, the University of 
Cambridge tabulates 16 risks, other universities itemise over 50. Most often, the risks are 
listed according to the severity of impact for the university.9 Reference to impact suggests a 
certain control over risk: that the university is able to identify all relevant events and to bring 
them into a (more or less) coherent order.  
 
Risk registers may group risks according to central categories. We have already briefly 
referred to HEFCE’s risk tree and suggested that grouping was a step in the evolution of risk 
regulation. We find a wide variety of grouping criteria. For example, the University of Bath 
groups its risks according to areas of responsibility or functionality. The eight groups have 
been labelled as follows: risks to (i) reputation / institutional profile, (ii) research, (iii) 
learning and teaching, (iv) knowledge transfer, (v) strategic partnership, (vi) human resources, 
(vii) estate and infrastructure, and (viii) financial issues. Between those groups no clear 
priorities emerge, they all appear to be of equal importance. Within each group, risks are 
ranked according to impact.10 The University of Derby groups risks according to institutional 
levels (central, departmental, institute); this approach highlights the accountability of the 
respective administrative levels. As a consequence, financial risks, risks of storm or terrorist 
attacks are located at the highest administrative level, while we find more concrete hazards 
(most often connected to teaching and research) at the level of departments and institutes. Yet 
another form of grouping risks can be found at universities that structure risk registers as in 
layers of an onion, distinguishing core risks, organisational risks and external risks. The core 
risks concern teaching and research. Around this core, we find organisational or delivery risks 
that emerge when managing the provision of teaching and research. A third layer concerns 
external risks that are beyond direct control and influence of individual universities (compare 
HEFCE’s academic risk model in HEFCE 2008: 43).  
 
Embedding assessments 
A second feature of risk registers concerns how the results of risk assessments are displayed. 
We can distinguish between a ‘simple’ approach, representing risk numerically, and an 
‘extended’ approach, where not only likelihood and damage are indicated, but attempts are 
made to further embed the risk assessment into university management.  
 
The numerical representation of risk either combines probability and damage, or accounts for 
them separately. Common for all universities, these assessments are represented by referring 
to a simple trinity of low, medium and high probability respectively, relating to damage 
values. The absolute damage values will vary with the size and wealth of the university, as 
does the probability of occurrence of certain events; thus they are made comparable through 
simplification across the sector. A widely recognised weakness of formalised risk 
management, namely the inability to clearly distinguish between frequently occurring events 
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 Methodologically, it is difficult to categorise events unequivocally. For example, risk that could be labelled as 
‘reputational’ are often also placed in the category ‘financial risks’, ‘strategic partnerships’ or ‘publicity’. 
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with low impact and exceptional events with a huge impact, is resolved by guidelines that 
suggest how to weight certain combinations of probabilities and damage values.  
 
The formalised assessment can be expanded in two ways. Firstly, universities may add risk 
dimensions. For example, some universities add a time dimension – specifiying short, 
medium or long term. By this means they intend to account for the period within which risks 
can be expected to affect and disturb normal organisational operations. The organisational 
attention is biased towards short-term issues rather than structural, long-term problems. For 
example, when Cambridge University assesses its estate related risks, the risk is considered 
‘low’ but in a comment this assessment is contradicted with reference to the time span taken 
into consideration: ‘A longer term view would indicate a less satisfactory position in relation 
to the need of redevelopment of central sites and the absence of a long-term capital 
programme’ (Cambridge 2009: 35). A second expansion of the risk concept takes place when 
universities assess individual risks twice. Risks are first assessed ‘objectively’ and numerical 
probability and damage values are attributed to specific events.11 Cambridge University 
defines these as raw, i.e. ‘the level of risk faced by an organisation before any internal 
controls are applied’ (Cambridge 2009: 1; emphasis added). Raw risks are ‘objective’ insofar 
as they do not account for the university’s preparedness in managing those risks and 
independent of risk appetite. Taking up these considerations, most universities develop the 
secondary concept of net or residual risk. It assesses ‘the level of risk faced by an 
organisation after internal controls have been applied’ ((Cambridge 2009: 1; emphasis 
added). Doubling risk assessment shifts the attention from risk features to the risk resilience 
of organisations. Net risks expand the range of events that should be accounted for since they 
reflect managerial properties and demand reference to risk owners, organisational measures 
containing risks and actors responsible for the organisational decisions on risks – all new 
organisational risks.  
 
Organisational structure and risk registers 
The sample of registers does not exhibit an obvious correlation between management and 
university structures. One reason could be that the risk tool is applied uniformly irrespective 
of structural differences. Variations could be explained either as random deviations or as 
development comparable to the three phases of HEFCE’s risk regime where universities start 
out by developing a very basic search strategy for academic risk that in a number of steps 
unfolds towards a more complex and flexible structure. Assuming such a learning model 
exists at university level, our empirical snapshot represents an unsynchronised yet uniform 
development across the higher education system as some universities are laggards whilst 
others are leaders in this process. Similarly, the numerical representation of academic risks 
can be perceived as a step in historical development, starting with some basic assessment and 
expanding towards an embedded strategy. Thus, differences in risk management only reflect 
different steps of the development. 
 
However, the idea that the formal representation of risk management in risk registers 
converges is not really supported by empirical evidence. For example, the difference between 
listing and grouping of risk events could be linked to the organisational ability of taking 
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binding decisions. For instance, if the financial independence of universities could serve as a 
proxy for rational decision making and organisational autonomy, it could be argued that 
financially independent universities can make binding decisions for the whole organisation 
and tend therefore to develop a uniform risk management. Conversely, less autonomous 
universities are loosely coupled, and have to compromise between excellent and normal 
departments, researchers and students. Instead of integrating these internal stakeholders into a 
comprehensive risk management the registers will be more fragmented and respond flexibly 
to a diversified organisational demand. Another explanation is that risk lists represent the 
entire university as they rank risks from a centralised perspective. This means either that a 
strong central administration is able to impose its view or structural differences between 
departments can be neglected; this in turn suggests that such registers are from uniform 
institutions.12 The same may be true for a collegially governed university, where a common 
value-base binds the members of the university together.13 Thus, it may be hypothesised that 
bureaucratically strong universities and value-based collegial institutions will use risk lists. 
And it seems persuasive to assume that other universities will have to develop a different 
strategy to account for risks. Risk groups focus on substantive issues and pre-suppose a 
loosely coupled organisation in terms of departments and quality. Compared to risk lists, 
grouping provides a more flexible risk approach. Not all members or sub-units of universities 
have to agree on an ‘objective’ ranking or subscribe to a common value base; they can operate 
in a more diversified way and still act unified. Thus, grouping risks may ease problems of 
coordination and veil insurmountable internal differences as well as the lack of organisational 
capacities to decide. Moreover, the introduction of a net-risk concept supports the basic divide 
outlined above: net risk requires organisational competence and skill from universities, and 
the ability to take rational decisions. Universities that subscribe to raw risk could be assumed 
to be less integrative and less autonomous.  
 
 
University risk management 
 
The brief analysis of the structure of risk registers ignored the ‘content’ of academic risk 
management. This section asks how academic risks are identified and thereby complements 
the previous analysis. Each structure of risk registers draws attention to specific aspects of 
risk management. This section follows the onion structure beginning with the analysis of core 
risks related to teaching and research and then investigating organisational and external risks. 
Alternatively we could have started with the top ranking risks, mostly financial and 
reputational loss, and worked our way down the lists. The onion structure highlights the 
organisational constraints to academic risk management whilst the focus on the risk lists 
draws attention to cross-cutting risk types such as reputational risk, which will be discussed 
later.  
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 It is not surprising that elite institutions such as Cambridge refer to a common value base as they are still 
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Teaching risks 
Starting with teaching and research focuses on the practical core of universities. Predictions 
about research quality prove to be extremely hard. For example, Merton (1973a) showed how 
difficult it is to assess academic quality in retrospect (e.g. in the form of awards) and that it is 
even more complicated trying to anticipate quality (e.g. in research funding). And for 
universities it is nearly impossible to foresee where academic innovation will occur. Similar 
concerns have been raised about the ‘technology-deficit’ of teaching (Luhmann & Schorr 
1988: 118 ff) that flags difficulties in predicting the impact of teaching. Thus it is of little 
surprise that risk registers link teaching risks not to the teaching process, but to teaching with 
contextual elements, such as students’ perceptions of teaching. For example, the risk register 
of an elite institution described its only learning risk as follows:  
 
• Teaching experience may undermine the market position 
 
This wording establishes a causal relationship that Cambridge University unfolds in quite 
some detail:14 
 
• Unsatisfactory student experience may lead to loss of reputation in relation to 
national and international competitors. Risk may be particularly high in the case of 
overseas students taking one-year courses.  
 
That student experience may negatively influence market position is immediately 
comprehensible but raises a set of problems. For example, can universities take decisions that 
have immediate influence on the market position? Can universities reliably monitor their 
environments? And, can challenges be connected with university decisions?  
 
As far as monitoring is concerned, the risk register explains that teaching experience is 
assessed through routine surveys of students’ learning experience.15 The Teaching Committee 
of this university routinely surveys student expectations and focuses on a set of factors that 
are traditionally expected to shape the students’ experience.16 For example, high fees and 
contact with teachers positively influence the experience, while the growing number of part-
time teachers, the fundamental tension between teaching obligations and the need to perform 
in the RAE unfold a negative impact; also class size and career structure for students shape 
the student’s expectations. When the university constructs teaching risks, it relies on the 
results and the methodology of these surveys. But this does not suffice for the needs of risk 
management. Two steps of a ‘translation process’ can be observed, and the first focuses on 
immediate resolvability. For example, the tension between teaching and research obligation is 
well recognised but seems irresolvable. Decision makers therefore prefer to select resolvable 
sub-risks such as:  
 
                                                        
14
 For our limited purpose the two risk descriptions may be taken as equivalent. A more detailed analysis would 
focus on the precise wording and the qualifying features added to the second statement (overseas students, 
compact courses, regulation) and by that highlight the difference between those two statements.  
15
 Learning captures the side of students, teaching the side of the university. This shift in focus is a first essential 
indicator for how external events are ‘internalised’. If teaching was the centre of attention, measures like 
grades or competence would be central to risk management.  
16
 These selected factors are unrelated to formal risk assessments.  
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• The excessive use of part time teachers  
• Insufficient training of (all) teachers 
• New technologies are not sufficiently used in teaching.  
 
These sub-risks break down ‘teaching experience’ into decisions on the number of part-time 
teachers, further training for teachers and on the use of new technologies (e.g. e-learning 
facilities). The university could decide to change the level of fees or implement strategies of 
how to deal with RAE results, but it considers these issues to be unfeasible. In a second step 
organisational structures come to bear on the solutions. For example, the suggested solutions 
focus on an organisationally weak group, the part-time teachers, who can easily be persuaded 
to change behaviour. In that way, the challenges of learning / teaching risks can be translated 
into attainable projects of teaching certificates, minor pay increase and more frequent office 
hours. The approach is shaped less by the intention to improve and rationalise the university’s 
management but rather by organisational power relations.  
 
This example of learning risks illustrates the difficulties in utilising risk management for the 
core functions of academia. Basically, the problem is to identify threats and then transform 
them into decidable issues. As teaching cannot be managed directly, universities focus on 
indirect indicators such as size of classes, number of part-time teachers or the fitting of rooms 
with teaching equipment. Organisational structures influence the selection process in three 
ways. Firstly, the choice of sub-risks suggests that the power structure – one could assume 
that the distinctive collegial system and a more fragmented, loosely coupled system could 
enlighten the analysis – shapes the choice of risks. Secondly, those who are requested to 
provide information systematically shape the decision. The identification of risks is biased by 
values and beliefs of small groups of risk owners and decision makers. Thirdly, risk owners 
could either be collective bodies (e.g. the Teaching Committee) or individual administrators. 
Their perspective on the university’s environment will vary accordingly.  
 
Research risks 
Research is the other core competence of universities. Again, the main focus in risk registers 
is on challenges to the university’s long-term performance in research funding, not in research 
proper. Two representative examples from elite institutions are: 
 
• REF method post 2008 not favourable to University  
• University may have to adapt its research strategy: excellent RAE outcomes have not 
translated into appropriate financial awards 
 
Instead of concentrating on actual research, the focus in risk registers is on failures in the 
assessment and evaluation methods that shape resource allocation. Two sources of risk can be 
distinguished: the assessment method is failure-ridden as (i) it is not as favourable to specific 
universities as previously or (ii) as the ability to correlate research and reward is defective and 
huge uncertainties emerge. Both sources weaken the strategic control capacities of 
universities (if they ever existed). While the first risk source draws attention to the ability of 
universities to adapt to a changing environment, the second source extends the range of risks 
towards institutional defects that individual universities cannot modify. One specific, often 
referred to aspect of this second source concerns the multiplicity of publicised rankings. The 
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risk that students, funding agencies or other stakeholders miscontrue the ranking because of 
the contradictory results based on different variables is reflected in numerous ways. For 
example: 
 
• At least some league tables will show the University in unfavourable light 
• Long term underpinning of fEC17 by Government not certain (but favourable review 
by RCs)18  
 
Risk registers distinguish the risk that regulators or funders may misjudge a flawless 
performance of the university from the risk that universities misunderstand the regulator’s 
monitoring strategies and therefore fail to develop adaptive strategies. If universities acquire 
(or not) benefits undeservingly or excellent RAE results do not pay off, in both cases the 
planning of realistic research strategies becomes difficult or even impossible. Note that risk 
registers largely ignore risks inherent to the research process or research strategies at 
university level. They are not assessed or evaluated in terms of risk, although they are 
decisive for the competitive success of universities.  
 
The examples presented above were taken from elite institutions. Other universities differ in 
their registering of research risks in two ways.19 For example, the University of Derby is less 
concerned with external recognition, but with ethical risks or with health and safety issues 
triggered by research. In the registers of elite institutions, these effects are assumed to be 
under control. Research proper is still not a potential risk. Another example is the risk 
management of the University of Bristol. It does not differ fundamentally in its perception of 
risk from the elite institutions’ perspective, although risk registers locate research risks not at 
university, but at departmental level or even lower in the hierarchy, at the level of individual 
research projects. These examples support the hypothesis that organisational conditions 
influence the ‘content’ of risk management and, simultaneously, that the university finds it 
difficult to reach its functional core with organisational means.  
 
Organisational or ‘delivery’ risks 
The number of core risks presented in the risk registers is surprisingly low so that we could 
talk about an ‘empty core’. By contrast, the number of risks related to the delivery of these 
core functions is ‘crowded’. ‘Delivery’ or ‘organisational’ risks reflect the organisational or 
procedural features that – in case of failure – may jeopardise the core functions of 
                                                        
17
 Full Economic Costs 
18
 Research Councils 
19
 Although evidence suggests that structural features of universities play a decisive role in the identification of 
academic risks, it proved difficult to group the universities in an unambiguous way. Size plays a role, and 
distinctions like research / teaching orientation and collegiality / managerialism (see Yokoyama 2006). To 
condense these features I use the distinction of elite and normal universities. Elite universities are characterised 
by research orientation, high collegiality and a smaller teacher / student ratio. Their risk identification does not 
differ much from that of post-1992 universities that focus on teaching and base their governance on managerial 
approaches. Although these two types mark the extremes of a continuum, the risk identification strategies of 
both display coherence. Central administrations can speak on behalf of their respective university. Normal 
universities usally have a more fragmented structure, mainly characterised by some departments exhibiting elitist 
features, others being less successful and therefore pose problems to a coherent strategy. This imperfect 
heuristics should make reading easier but would require more empirical underpinning before it can be used with 
analytical rigor.  
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universities. Such organisational risks range from investments in ‘wrong’ personnel,20 the 
breakdown of IT, to terrorist attacks. Some universities focus on technical breakdowns and 
external threats, others (mainly elite institutions) are more concerned about the provision of 
an effective administrative framework. We found that only one university (Cambridge) 
explicitly considered the asymmetries in reputation and research funding between 
departments as a source of organisational risks.  
 
The current financial crisis is conceived to be at the core of organisational risks. Risk 
management is based on the assumption that virtually all academic activities, services and 
practices can turn out to be related to financial risk. This central position of financial risks is 
also expressed in its very generic presentation. For example: 
 
• Impact of financial downturn / ‘recession’  
 
All aspects of the financial crisis are considered to be risks, an initial impression that 
misrepresents the considerations of some universities. First and foremost we find that elite 
institutions are mainly concerned with cuts in their income that are related to research 
funding. For example:  
 
• Fundraising policy may need to be reviewed,  
• Research income from industry may decrease 
 
Universities like the University of Derby focus rather on the their students’ ability to pay the 
fees. 
 
• Economic recession: the deepening of an economic recession could reduce public 
sector funding and reduce family resources for educational purposes. This could 
adversely affect recruitment. The effects may be partially mitigated by shortage of 
employment thereby encouraging people to become students.  
 
Depending on their income structure, universities see the recession either as a problem of 
family income and basic government funding or as a challenge to research funding. One 
specific risk, registered only by elite institutions, concerns the placement difficulties of 
students due to the recession. Moreover, recession is problematic for elite institutions not 
because of the number, but because of the right mix of students. Others, in particular post-
1992 universities see recession rather as chance to attract more students due to problems in 
the job market.  
 
Common to all registers is that delivery risks are related to ‘inefficient’ or even failing award 
systems, problems of coordination or due to simple negligence. However, cost control and 
efficiency concerns do not only imply that universities risk spending too much or use the 
resources ineffectively, but that too little money spent may influence a university’s reputation. 
In other words, internally exaggerated demands on efficiency may backfire if representational 
expectations are not met. 
                                                        
20
 Interestingly, ‘personnel’ is not a risk to the quality of research and teaching but an indicator of the dwindling 
attractiveness of universities (see ‘Constructing academic as reputational risk’). 
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External risks
21
  
A final group of external ‘risks’ concerns those that are explicitly located outside the 
decisional horizon of universities. Rankings, league tables or the financial recession are such 
events that cannot be influenced by organisational decisions directly, although they are 
considered relevant for all managerial decisions. The main task here is to assure 
organisational members and regulatory agencies of the alertness of universities.  
 
 
Constructing ‘academic’ as reputational risk 
 
Risk registers illustrate the difficulty in establishing a direct link between organisational 
decisions and risk events. When the teaching encountered by overseas students was expected 
to undermine the market position of a university, the number of part-time teachers or teaching 
equipment substituted the risk item. This may be taken as an indicator for universities 
developing ‘theories’ of causal relations between risks and events that however miss ‘the 
correct instrument to measure which explanation is relevant and therefore often rely on highly 
speculative interpretations’ (Musselin 2007: 73).22 One crucial element to bind all those 
theories and risks together can be found in the concept of reputational risk that emerges as a 
genuine type of academic risk. Reputational risks may be interpreted as the other side of, or 
complementary to, financial risks that were the basis of the organisational risks. Reputational 
risks reflect the particularities of the university. Power et al (2009: 304) claim that with 
reputational risks surface ‘new and disturbing understandings of responsibility, accountability 
and decision making’, features that embed risk management in academia. The special status 
of reputation is derived from the key function of reputation in science where it works as a 
crucial strategy to guide scientific communication (Merton 1973b). Thus, to understand what 
reputational risks could be, it is worth recalling the main features of the concept of reputation.  
 
Reputational risk 
Reputation is the signalling system of science drawing attention to those scholars who have 
performed outstandingly and, with some probability, will repeat their success. Reputation 
simplifies the monitoring of the scientific debate for all scholars by pre-selecting promising 
contributions on the basis of previous accomplishments. In that way, reputation provides the 
possibility for other scholars to tie in more suitably into the academic debate and purchase 
reputation more effectively. This reduction of complexity only works if reputation is 
attributed by the invisible hand (Luhmann 1990: 246). If the attribution can be traced back to 
the interests of certain persons, groups or organisations, the reputation will be considered 
manipulated, corrupted and in turn, worthless as far as scientific communication is concerned. 
Related to this notion of reputation, reputational risk may refer to three challenges: 
 
                                                        
21
 It is questionable if they are risks in a formal sense at all, as they are ‘not a consequence of the decision, that is 
to say, it is attributed to the decision’ but ‘the possible loss is considered to have been caused externally, that is 
to say, it is attributed to the environment’ (Luhmann 2008: 20 f).  
22
 Carolyn Booker (Strathclyde) studied the risk management of one university department in her unpublished 
MA thesis and showed how members of the organisation construct academic risks and which events are 
considered essential. One critical element in these constructions was reputation (personal communication). 
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• corruption of the invisible hand – e.g. if politics or economic interest systematically 
prejudices the attribution of reputation.   
• sending of confusing, unambiguous signals of reputational communication; as a 
consequence, scholars or students misread the signals and act inappropriately.  
• loss of reputation – e.g. measured in diminishing league table results or rankings.  
 
The first two aspects were discussed as genuine research risks (see above). They referred to 
methodological and political failures of the ranking and evaluation systems. Although risks 
emerging from this source could principally be managed, the ability of individual universities 
to optimise this process is rather restricted. The second source of reputational risks, the 
confusion about signals, is inherent in the global evaluation system.23  
 
The third source of reputational risks, the loss of reputation, is often measured in terms of 
changes in ranking results. However, the use of reputational risks is not restricted to rankings. 
Risk registers use reputational loss rather as generic academic risks that can be triggered by 
virtually any event within and outside of universities. In the accounts of risk registers, 
reputational risks range from property management to the impact of press statements by staff, 
bad press about student excursions, equality and diversity issues to a dirty classroom. 
Reputational risk has become an all-purpose tool for risk management. In the light of risk 
identification, this development raises the question of how these reputational losses are 
identified and how are they linked to university decisions. 
 
To illustrate the uses of reputational loss, we start by outlining from our research how 
reputation is linked to challenges emerging from the origin of reputation. For example 
(underline added): 
 
• Reduction in research income would impact seriously on University finances and 
reputation.  
• Fall in research funding ... would have a serious impact on the finances of the 
University, on staff morale and on reputation. 
 
Research risks are, first of all, linked to financial flows. Attaching reputation as another risk 
area suggests that wider academic features need to be considered when the normal operation 
of universities is scrutinised. The external recognition for research may not only be expressed 
in terms of rewards, financial contributions, RAE and rankings, but is also mirrored in the 
common attractiveness of universities for future staff and students.  
 
• Difficulty in attracting the best staff especially at professorial level … Quality of staff 
is a key factor in the University’s future performance and reputation.  
 
These indicators are primarily relevant for the orientation within the scientific and educational 
system. Thus the impact of reputational loss cannot be restricted to research staff and reward 
                                                        
23
 In the UK, the RAE and HEFCE’s assessment of risk assessment dominate the higher education sector. The 
German university system lacks one dominant evaluation scheme and the growing number of similar 
evaluations generates a deepening problem of reliability and orientation.  At the international level, such 
dangers of disorientation are well documented.  
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systems but needs to also account for failures in governance that may influence the scientific  
(and educational) performance of universities. Their impact is measured again in terms of the 
reputational loss of universities and of course their financial situation. For example: 
 
• Elements of poor governance with regard to control and management. This can lead 
to adverse publicity and reputational and financial harm.  
• On-going health and safety risk (short/med/long term) requiring constant monitoring. 
If this risk were to crystallize to any great degree the medium to long-term 
consequences could have serious financial and reputational damage.  
 
Some preliminary remarks on reputational risks may be derived from these examples. Firstly, 
as virtually every organisational decision impacts directly or indirectly on staff, students, 
university governance and academic working conditions, these decisions may be linked up 
with the risk of reputational loss. However, the selection of causal links will depend on the 
university’s ability to manage issues than on the objective challenge. Secondly, as reputation 
is recognised by the invisible hand, local theories of what organisational elements may 
influence this unknown aspect flourish, as they cannot be controlled by the organisation. 
Moreover, when the concept is expanded to the organisation, governance in all its facets gains 
leverage and turn out to be risky. Thus, the quality of teaching rooms, technical equipment or 
the handling of safety issues may impact on reputation, as may the financial management, 
research styles and personnel. Thirdly, reputation is increasingly diversified according to 
stakeholders. Reputation plays a role for student’s recruitment, determines the attractiveness 
for staff, but also shapes the public image of the university. The university is conceptualised 
as Kerr’s (1963) ‘multiversity’ that has to respect and balance the interests of numerous 
stakeholders. The problem is that forms of reputational loss may contradict each other and, 
reflexively, turn a reputational risk into a risk in its own right.  
 
Reputation and organisation 
Expanding reputational risks from individual to organisational concerns generates a flexible 
concept, applicable to virtually all events. All universities apply it, not only organisations 
with a clear focus on research or with a global orientation. Two aspects augment the 
importance of reputational risks for the higher education sector. Firstly, the flexibility of the 
concept enables it to link virtually all events to organisational decisions. The multitude of 
possibilities demands selection. Risks are selected in accordance with organisational features, 
power relations and interest constellations. For example, elite institutions primarily link 
reputational risks to ranking or evaluation results. ‘Normal’ universities focus on reputational 
loss as a challenge to the general impression of the university in the national market 
addressing concerns of the scientific community and funding organisations as well as  
students or their parents, the relevant stakeholders. Here the entire philosophy of risk 
management may be turned upside down: it is no longer the objective severity of events that 
determine the alertness of the university, but the preparedness of the university defines the 
severity of events to be managed. Secondly, reputational indicators allow universities to 
monitor the sector, identify challenges and in turn to adapt organisations. In particular, 
reputational risks capture weak signals of poor governance, long-term effects of decreasing 
funding, demotivation of staff, poor selection of students or bad publicity and they provide 
university administration with a sensitive tool to capture the complex environment.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
While the overriding rule of notoriously risk-averse bureaucracies was ‘never to permit 
surprises’ (Luhmann 2008: 190), did universities embrace risk management, reluctantly at 
first and at least as far as risk identification is concerned? Universities were faced with 
considerable uncertainty about academic risks. Two features of the process search for 
academic risks attracted particular attention. Firstly, universities could not capture their core 
functions – teaching and research – with organisational means. Instead, universities had to 
find proxies that they could link up with organisational decisions. Here the second feature 
concerning reputational risk comes into play. Reputational risk provides an all-purpose tool 
for risk management allowing universities to capture all possible challenges and problems in 
terms of risk. Generally it was assumed that these features contribute to the rationalisation of 
the academic sector. However, the modernising impetus of risk management ceases when 
confronted with the university as a special organisation. While HEFCE expected that risk 
management improves university governance ‘because the risks have been identified, are 
understood’ (HEFCE 2001a), this expectation has little bearing on the identification of 
academic risks by universities. Universities prefer exploiting the flexibilities of the risk tool 
according to their skills, interests and entrepreneurial force. Moreover, the structural 
particularities of universities provided the foundation for the variation of risk management. 
Their form varied with the degree of bureaucratic organisations, loose coupling or along the 
difference between elite institutions and other universities including post-1992 ones. For the 
argument it was less important to identify the precise structural features that determined the 
outcome, but it was more important to see that organisational features played a role, beyond 
the anticipated particularities of the university. The special organisation that forms the 
university did not assimilate risk management to be a rational strategic actor, but in the 
development of academic risk management the formalised management tool of risk was 
adapted to organisational needs and structures.  
 
However, the sample was too small to further develop grand hypotheses about academic risk 
management, but large enough to develop some ideas for further research. Firstly, the study 
presented should be put on a broader empirical basis. Registers should be compared and 
secondary organisational features of universities (size, profile etc.) should be operationalised 
more systematically and carefully. Secondly, while we discuss the formal structure of risk 
assessment, the actual process remains opaque. What is the empirical basis for the assessment 
of academic risks? Do universities or departments develop systematic ideas about academic 
risks? How is resilience assessed? How are risk owners selected? In short, the practical 
approach to risk management requires in-depth examination. It was not touched upon in this 
paper. Thirdly, a set of research questions can be derived from the problem of how the risk 
tool was diffused across the sector and within universities. Which were the universities 
particularly eager to adapt to risk management? Was the diffusion based on individual or 
collective strategies? Can we identify a first-mover advantage or did second mover benefit? 
Fourthly, an issue that was hard to trace in registers concerns conflict resolution. How do 
universities deal with structural or power related tensions and conflicts? What type of 
university develops what type of conflict resolution? Fifthly, it was assumed that structural 
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changes of universities are minimal as risk management is adopted for all problems implying 
that ‘the breath of the phenomenon excludes the more specialized differentiation of risk 
management as a particular function of certain offices or departments. It is rather to be seen as 
a particular form of critical monitoring of all decisions by means of second-order observation’ 
(Luhmann 2008: 189). But does this hypothesis hold? Do risk offices and officers function as 
crystallisation points for a further bureaucratisation and new dynamics of university 
development or is the university still doomed at being unable to reform itself? And last but 
not least, the effects of the implementation of the risk management need to be analysed in 
more detail. Is risk management just a ritual of verification vis-à-vis regulatory agencies that 
has little bearing on organisational decision making or does risk management change 
decisions? Are genuine academic decisions taken under the impression of risk management? 
And again, how does the openness for such decision processes depend on specific features of 
universities? When initially it was suggested that we know about academic risk management, 
this paper rather suggests that there is much work ahead. 
 
 
References 
 
Braun, D. (2001) ‘Regulierungsmodelle und Machtstrukturen an Universitäten’, in E. Stölting 
& U. Schimank (eds.), Die Krise der Universität.  Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 
243–62. 
Brunsson, N. & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2000) ‘Constructing organizations: the example of 
public sector reform’, Organization Studies 21(4): 721–46. 
Cambridge (2009) ‘University of Cambridge risk register’, last accessed 7 July 2009, 
<http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/offices/secretariat/risk/register/> 
Cohen, M.D. & March, J.G. (1974) Leadership and ambiguity: the American college 
president.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Cohen, M.D., March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P. (1972) ‘A garbage can model of organizational 
choice’, Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1): 1–25. 
DiMaggio, J.P & Powell, W.W (1991) ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality’, in W.W. Powell & P.J. DiMaggio (eds.), The new 
institutionalism in organisational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press  
Frank D.J. & Meyer, J.W. (2007) ‘Worldwide expansion and change in the university’, in G. 
Krücken, A. Kosmützky & M. Torka (eds.), Towards a multiversity? Universities 
between global trends and national traditions. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. 
HEFCE [Higher Education Funding Council for England] (2000) ‘HEFCE’s accounts 
direction to higher education institutions for 2000-01’, Circular Letter 24/00, 
<www.hefece.ac.uk/pubs/circlets/2000/cl24_00.htm> last accessed 8 June 2009. 
HEFCE (2001a) Risk management: briefing for governors and senior managers, 01/ 24  
  < http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/hefce/2001/01_24.htm> 
HEFCE (2001b) Risk management: a guide to good practice for higher education institutions,  
01 / 28 < http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/hefce/2001/01_28.htm> 
HEFCE (2008)  ‘Strategic Plan 2006-11’. Bristol: HEFCE. 
Hood  C. & Rothstein, H. (2001) ‘Risk regulation under pressure. problem solving or blame 
shifting?’, Administration & Society  33 (1): 21–53. 
 20 
Hood, C., Rothstein, H. & Baldwin, R. (2001) The government of risk. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Huber, C. (2009) ‘Risk and risk based regulation in higher education institutions’, Tertiary 
Education and Management 15 (2): 83–95. 
Huber, M. (2008) ‘Fundamental ignorance in the regulation of reactor safety and flooding. 
The risk of knowledge management in the risk society’, in N. Stehr, & B. Weiler (eds.), 
Who owns knowledge? Knowledge and the law, New York: Transaction Publisher, pp. 
107–24. 
Huber, M. (2010) ‘Colonised by risk. The emergence of academic risks in English higher 
education’, in B.M. Hutter (ed.), Anticipating risks and organizing risk regulation in 
21st century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kerr, C. (1963) The uses of the university. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 5th edn 
2001. 
Krücken, G. & Meier, F. (2006) ‘Turning the university into an organizational actor’, in G. S. 
Drori, J.W. Meyer & H. Hwang (eds.), Globalization and organization. World society 
and organizational change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 241–57. 
Luhmann, N. (1990) Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
Luhmann, N. (2008) Risk: a sociological theory. New York: de Gruyter 
Luhmann N. & Schorr, E. (1988) Reflexionsprobleme im Erziehungssystem. Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp. 
McNamara R.P. & Booth, P. (1984) ‘Effective management techniques in tertiary 
administration: a risk management framework’, Journal of Tertiary Educational 
Administration 6 (2): 175–82. 
Merton, R.K.  (1973a) ‘Recognition and excellence. Instructive ambiguities. In R.K. Merton, 
The sociology of science. Theoretical and empirical investigations. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Merton, R.K.  (1973b) ‘The Matthew effect in science’, in R.K. Merton, The sociology of 
science. Theoretical and empirical investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Meyer J.W. & Rowan, B. (1977) ‘Institutionalized organizations: formal structures as myth 
and ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology 83: 340–63. 
Moran, M. (2003) The British regulatory state. High modernism and hyper innovation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Musselin, C. (2007) ‘Are universities specific organisations?’, in G. Krücken, A. Kosmützky, 
& M. Torka (eds.), Towards a multiversity? Universities between global trends and 
national traditions. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. 
North, D.C. (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Power, M. (1997) The audit society. Rituals of verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Power, M., Scheytt, T., Soin, K. & Sahlin, K. (2009) ‘Reputational risk as a logic of 
organizing in late modernity’, Organization Studies 30 (2/3): 301–24. 
Raban, C. & Turner, E. (2003) ‘Academic risk: quality risk management in higher education’, 
HEFCE Good Management Practice Project Interim Report. Bristol: HEFCE.  
Raban, C. & Turner, E. (2006) ‘Quality risk management. Modernising the architecture of 
quality assurance’, Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education 10 (2): 39–
44. 
 21 
Rose, N. (1999) ‘Numbers’, in N. Rose (ed.), Powers of freedom. Reframing political thought, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rothstein, H., Huber, M. & Gaskell, G. (2006) ‘A theory of risk colonisation: the spiralling 
logics of societal and institutional risk’, Economy and Society 35 (1): 91–112. 
Shattlock, M. (2006) ‘Policy drivers in UK higher education in historical perspective: ‘inside 
out’, ‘outside in’ and the contribution to research’, Higher Education Quarterly 60(2): 
130–40.  
Stichweh, R. (1994) ‘Die Form der Universität’, in R.Stichweh, (ed.), Wissenschaft, 
Universität, Professionen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.  
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Wedlin, L. (2007) ‘The role of rankings in codifying a business school template: 
classifications, diffusion and mediated isomorphism in organizational fields’, European 
Management Review 4 (1): 24–39. 
Weick, K.E. (1976) ‘Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems’, Administrative 
Science Quarterly 21 (1): 1–19 
Yokoyama K. (2006) ‘The effect of the research assessment exercise on organisational culture 
in English universities: collegiality versus managerialism’, Tertiary Education and 
Management 12 (4): 311–22. 
Centre for Analysis  
of Risk and Regulation
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London  WC2A 2AE
tel: +44 (0)20 7955 6577
fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7420
email: risk@lse.ac.uk
lse.ac.uk/CARR
